Unaffordable prices continue to obstruct access to antiretroviral drugs in income-constrained countries. This article explores the fitness of a multi-pronged, incentive-bound, WHO-mediated voluntary license strategy for attuning research, innovation, profit and equitable access to antiretrovirals in under-served markets. The potential of the model was investigated by examining: the predictable effect on current regulatory practices (trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights [TRIPS] and TRIPS-plus measures); the expected benefits, either in terms of equity or safeguarding of the generic and brand name manufacturer’s interests; the interplay dynamics with drug trading policies of deeply concerned countries (China, India, countries in the EU, USA, Brazil, South Africa and Thailand); and the suitability for helping plants for generic antiretrovirals, including home plants in Sub-Saharan Africa, undertake research and development partnerships encompassing innovation, technological catch-up, exploitation of TRIPS flexibilities, as well as raised marketing power and an increase in domestic employment. The explored strategy, although far from being the ideal solution, looks like it would be reliable to help expand equitable and sustainable access to appropriate antiretrovirals in resource-limited populations, as long as it entwines with the WHO’s brokerage. It should also boost know-how, technology transfer, innovation, research and development, as well as national industry plant development and penetration of the wealthy and under-served markets by generic drug enterprises.